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Director of Special Education for Deptford
Township School District; BARBARA GANTWERK,
in her official capacity as Director of
the New Jersey Office of Special Education;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, in his official
capacity as Attorney General of the State of New Jersey,
Third-Party Defendants.
____________
On Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
D. C. No. 01-cv-00784
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
____________

Argued May 5, 2008
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 21, 2008)
James F. Schwerin (Argued)
Parker McCay
1009 Lenox Drive
Building 4 East, Suite 102A
Lawrenceville, NJ 08648-0000
Attorney for Appellant
Jamie Epstein (Argued)
1101 Route 70 West
Cherry Hill, NJ 08002-0000
Attorney for Appellees
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Deptford Township School District appeals the District Court’s award of
attorneys’ fees to H.B. and her parents E.B. and P.B. (Appellees) pursuant to the
Individuals With Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA). Because we conclude that
Appellees were not the “prevailing party,” we will reverse.
I.
As we write exclusively for the parties, we recount only those facts essential to our
decision.
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H.B. is an autistic child who qualifies for educational services under the IDEA, 20
U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. H.B. began attending school in the Deptford Township School
District on February 16, 1999. Shortly thereafter, H.B.’s parents met with her educational
team to prepare an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for the upcoming school year.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). After H.B.’s parents objected to the IEP proposed by the
School District, its Special Services Director requested a mediation conference. The
parents declined to mediate and filed a petition for due process with the New Jersey
Office of Special Education. The matter was assigned to the Honorable John R. Futey
(ALJ).
On December 6, 2000, the ALJ found that Deptford “failed to provide H.B. with a
meaningful education” and ordered it to create “a full day in-district program in a regular
education class” tailored to H.B.’s needs and to compensate the family for their costs in
educating H.B. in the interim.
The School District appealed the ALJ’s decision to the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey on February 15, 2001. Over three months later, the School
District requested a stay of enforcement of the ALJ’s decision, which the Court denied on
November 2, 2001. Thereafter, the School District moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the ALJ erred in finding that it failed to provide H.B. with a “free appropriate
public education” (FAPE), 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1), in the “least restrictive environment”
(LRE), id. at § 1412(a)(5).
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By order dated February 15, 2002, the District Court reversed the ALJ’s
determination that Deptford failed to provide a FAPE to H.B., but agreed that it failed to
do so in the least restrictive environment. Because no harm resulted from the lack of the
LRE, however, the District Court granted no relief. The District Court required
Appellees “to return the portion of the previous interim payment which had not been
actually spent in reliance on the ALJ’s erroneous decision,” but permitted them “to retain
funds spent in good faith reliance upon the ALJ’s determination” prior to its reversal.
Based solely on the fact that Appellees “were allowed to obtain and retain”
compensation for interim services “to which Deptford had challenged their entitlement,”
the District Court entered an order on March 31, 2006, deeming Appellees the “prevailing
party” for purposes of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) and subsequently awarded them
$98,550 in attorneys’ fees.
II.
We begin by noting that the School District’s principal argument is that Appellees
were not entitled to attorneys’ fees because they did not prevail. For reasons unknown to
the Court, Appellees fail to address this argument in their brief. Instead, Appellees rely
exclusively on their argument that the School District cannot challenge the order of
March 31, 2006, in which the District Court determined that Appellees were the
“prevailing party,” because Deptford’s Notice of Appeal cites only the District Court’s
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December 22, 2006 order quantifying attorneys’ fees at $98,550. This argument betrays a
fundamental misunderstanding of our precedents.
An award of attorneys’ fees is not a final, appealable order until the award is
quantified. Frangos v. Doering Equip. Corp., 860 F.2d 70, 72 (3d Cir. 1988);
Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 983 F.2d 1267, 1276 (3d Cir. 1993). Under the merger
doctrine, an appeal of a final award of attorneys’ fees includes appeal of all interlocutory
orders relevant thereto. See In re Diet Drug Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 377 (3d
Cir. 2005).
In the present appeal, the Court’s interlocutory order, which designated the
Appellees as the “prevailing party,” was directly relevant to the Court’s final order, which
awarded fees in the amount of $98,500. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).
Consequently, the March 31 order merges into the December 22 order, and both are
before us.
Generally, we review the grant of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion. See
P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we will
reverse the award if it “rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion
of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Id. (quoting Hanover Potato Prods.,
Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993)).
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III.
Turning to the merits, we first note that there can be no doubt that Appellees
achieved victory in the administrative proceedings. The ALJ ruled that the School
District “failed to provide H.B. with a meaningful education” and ordered Deptford to
create “a full day in-district program in a regular education class” tailored to H.B.’s
needs. In addition, the ALJ ordered Deptford to compensate H.B.’s parents for their costs
in educating H.B. in the interim.
After Appellees’ favorable decision at the administrative proceeding, the School
District appealed, as was its right, to federal court. The District Court reversed the ALJ’s
decision, stating:
[T]he only relief obtained by [Appellees] was to enforce compliance with
the ALJ’s decision prior to the time it was partially reversed by this Court,
and [Appellees] achieved no relief upon the aspect of the ALJ’s ruling that
was affirmed (namely, failure to provide the LRE) because [Appellees]
could demonstrate no harm. The [Appellees] achieved this Court’s interim
award of $88,090.61, consistent with the ALJ’s determination and before its
reversal, because Deptford had not timely sought a stay of same, but not
because [Appellees] proved entitlement upon this record. When it turned
out that the ALJ’s award was reversed in relevant part, and that no remedy
was due for failure to provide the education in the least restrictive
environment, the Court basically ordered [Appellees] to return the portion
of the previous interim payment which had not been actually spent in
reliance on the ALJ’s erroneous decision. [Appellees] were, however,
allowed to retain funds spent in good faith reliance upon the ALJ’s
determination prior to this Court’s various rulings, and to this extent,
[Appellees] “prevailed,” that is, they were allowed to obtain and retain at
least a part of the funds and benefits to which Deptford had challenged their
entitlement. (Emphasis added.)
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We find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s factual findings, and we accept
them in toto. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 52(a)(6). Therefore, we next consider whether the
District Court committed legal error in holding that Appellees were the “prevailing party”
under § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) of the IDEA, which provides:
Award of attorneys’ fees . . . In any action or proceeding brought under this
section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as
part of the costs . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a
disability.
In a seminal decision regarding attorneys’ fees, the Supreme Court held that a
party is not a “prevailing party” unless it “prevailed on the merits of at least some . . .
claims,” or received “at least some relief on the merits.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).1 Purely technical or de minimis success is insufficient.
Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989).
Likewise, preliminary or interim success unaccompanied by ultimate success of some
kind is generally insufficient. See People Against Police Violence v. City of Pittsburgh,
520 F.3d 226, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (indicating that where initial relief proves fleeting,
attorneys’ fees are inappropriate).

1

We have held that the teachings of Buckhannon are directly applicable to the
IDEA attorneys’ fees provision. John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Delaware County Intermediate
Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Indeed, last Term the Supreme Court held that “[p]revailing party status . . . does
not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or
otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case.” Sole v. Wyner, 127 S.Ct. 2188,
2195 (2007). In a similar vein, we have observed that “when a judgment in favor of a
[party] is reversed on the merits, that party is no longer a ‘prevailing party’ . . . and no
longer entitled to attorney’s fees.” Clark v. Twp. of Falls, 890 F.2d 625, 626 (3d Cir.
1989) (emphasis added).
Applying these principles to the instant appeal, we disagree with the District
Court’s conclusion that Appellees achieved prevailing party status under
§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) of the IDEA because they were not required to return that portion of
the ALJ’s interim award which they had already spent. The fact that Appellees achieved
only temporary relief requires judgment in favor of the School District because such relief
is not equivalent to final relief on the merits. See John T., 318 F.3d at 556, 559; J.O. v.
Orange Twp. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2002). As noted, the District Court
expressly concluded that Appellees failed to prove their entitlement to relief on the
merits. Without such a victory, Appellees cannot be considered the “prevailing party.”
See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603; Sole, 127 S.Ct. at 2196.2

2

Finally, we note that even if the District Court’s finding with respect to the least
restrictive environment issue rendered Appellees the “prevailing party,” an award of
attorneys’ fees would not be proper on the particular facts of this case. See Farrar v.
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 105, 115 (1992). As the District Court noted, the relief achieved
here was “scant and unimpressive,” and Appellees achieved no relief on the LRE issue.
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For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of the District Court awarding
fees and remand for judgment to be entered in favor of Deptford Township School
District.

Moreover, Appellees’ attorney – either through gross carelessness or worse – initially
sought fees that included 60 hours billed in a single day. See Fair Housing Council of
Greater Wash. v. Landow, 999 F.2d 92, 96 (4th Cir. 1993). On this record, we find that
fees should not have been awarded.
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